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KNOWLEDGE CURATION
Michael J. Madison*
This Article addresses conservation, preservation, and stewardship of
knowledge, and laws and institutions in the cultural environment that support
those things. Legal and policy questions concerning creativity and innovation
usually focus on producing new knowledge and offering access to it.
Equivalent attention rarely is paid to questions of old knowledge. To what
extent should the law, and particularly intellectual property law, focus on the
durability of information and knowledge? To what extent does the law do so
already, and to what effect? This Article begins to explore those questions.
Along the way, the Article takes up distinctions among different types of creativity and knowledge, from scholarship and research to commercial entertainment
and so-called “User Generated Content”; distinctions among objects, works of
authorship, and legal rights accompanying both; distinctions among creations
built to last (sometimes called “sustained” works), creations built for speed
(including “ephemeral” works), and creations barely built at all (works closely
tied to the authorial “self”); and distinctions between analog and digital
contexts.
INTRODUCTION
Legal and policy analyses of creativity and innovation usually
focus on producing new knowledge and offering access to it.1
 2011 Michael J. Madison. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; Faculty Director,
Innovation Practice Institute. Email: michael.j.madison@gmail.com. An earlier
version of this Article was presented at a conference on Creativity and the Law at
Notre Dame Law School. Thanks to participants at that conference for their
comments and suggestions.
1 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Does IP Need IP? Accommodating Intellectual
Production Outside the Intellectual Property Paradigm, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1437, 1438–39
(2010) (describing the challenges of understanding intellectual property law in contexts where intellectual production occurs despite the the absence of IP rights);
Dotan Oliar & Christopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The Emergence of
Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV.
1957
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Equivalent questions concerning existing knowledge, preserving and
conserving old things and offering access to them, get less frequent
attention. In this article, I describe a framework for addressing conservation, preservation, and stewardship of works in the cultural environment and legal and other institutions for doing those things. This
is sometimes characterized as the problem of cultural heritage, a
phrase that tends to focus attention on particular objects, or (at other
times) as the problem of intergenerational equity, a phrase that
evokes people more than knowledge itself. I refer to it as the challenge of knowledge curation.
Creativity and innovation in their several forms are species of
knowledge. They are ways of knowing, experiencing, and interacting
with the social and physical world. Intellectual property (IP) law is the
default starting point for discussions of the legal regulation of knowledge that touch all actors in society. It is appropriate, therefore, to
consider the extent to which knowledge curation is an IP law problem. Do preservation, conservation, and stewardship of knowledge
present intellectual property law questions? They do, in the sense that
they present questions to which intellectual property law often
responds, such as questions of access to knowledge, authenticity, influence, cultural and economic progress, and authorial and reputational
interest. Intellectual property law therefore seems ripe for extension
beyond the new, to the old. But knowledge curation also stands at
some distance from standard IP models. The usual public goods
model of IP is an awkward fit for curation challenges. It is far from
clear that society suffers from overconsumption of existing cultural
artifacts and other older forms of knowledge and insufficient investment in their preservation. Moreover, it is far from clear that these
problems, if they exist, should be addressed by granting limited rights
of exclusion to owners of older forms of knowledge. Conversely, one
might argue that social interests in the preservation and conservation
of knowledge are adequately secured by intentionally omitting that
subject matter from the scope of limited copyright, patent, and trademark rights. But that case, too, is incomplete.
Those claims may be extended preliminarily, as follows. A legal
framework for durable forms of knowledge is partly baked into the
structure of IP law, but negatively, and to a limited degree. The public goods case for IP regimes holds that the law properly addresses
questions concerning durability of the creative or innovative intangi1787, 1790 (2008) (“Conventional intellectual property wisdom suggests that absent
formal legal protection, there will be an inadequate provision of creative works, as
authors and inventors would be unlikely to recoup their cost of creation.”).
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ble—the “original work of authorship,”2 the patentable “invention,”3
the distinctive “mark” or “sign”4—via a framework of limited exclusive
rights for creators and innovators balanced by rights of access and use
reserved to the public.5 In copyright and patent law, the primary
point of the law is to encourage production and distribution of the
new.6 Creative and innovative work of this sort is preserved by law and
otherwise so that it can be used and so that it can be changed, that is,
adapted for new purposes, for new audiences, and so on.7 Acceptance
of durability is a byproduct of the focus on novelty. As the rights/
access balance requires, rights expire, and some material is excluded
from protection altogether. Fundamental forms of knowledge are
preserved negatively, by exclusion, for the benefit of successive generations. Copyright law excludes ideas;8 patent law excludes laws of
nature;9 and both doctrines exclude nonnovel and nonoriginal works.
Trademark law should be considered separately, because it is less concerned with the new. Trademarks protect commercial enterprises
from unfair competition and protect consumers from marketplace
confusion. Still, indirectly, trademark offers a modest but nonetheless
negative legal framework for conserving the identity of intangible
forms of knowledge, in this case commercial symbols. Trademark
2 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006) (noting that copyright subsists in “original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression”).
3 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor . . . .”).
4 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name,
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof [used by a person] to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured
or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is
unknown.”). Foreign trademark systems often described trademarks in terms of
“signs” rather than “marks.” See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, art. 15, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS
Agreement], reprinted in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999).
5 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010) (noting that tests for
patentable subject matter must take care not to “obscur[e] the larger object of securing patents for valuable inventions without transgressing the public domain”).
6 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450
(1984) (“The purpose of copyright is to create incentives for creative effort.”).
7 See Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital
Age, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1019–39 (2007) (trying to recover a sense of preservation
and access policies in copyright law, grounded in limitations, exclusions, and safe
harbors).
8 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
9 See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
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doctrines require that the mark owner maintain differentiation
among different but independently consistent specific commercial
identities and social meanings.10 The rights of the mark owner continue indefinitely, despite changes to the mark, so long as the mark
offers consumers “the same, continuing commercial impression.”11
The point of the law is not to encourage investment in durable forms
of knowledge, but to limit risks faced by trademark owners who wish
to innovate with new marketing strategies.
In short, intellectual property doctrines and their justifications
generally invest far more rhetorical and analytic energy on creativity
and innovation than on stability and durability.12 Preservation and
conservation of older forms of knowledge are left largely, if not
entirely, to the domain of tangible property law, where a rich body of
law, policy, and custom has developed around the preservation of art
and artifacts.13 Importantly, copyright and patent law both require
modest investments in fixed forms of new knowledge.14 Below, I consider some the implications of those rules for knowledge curation.
But fixation rules feed the production of artifacts of knowledge; curation of knowledge requires more. Related analysis of traditional
knowledge (TK), traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) (also known
as folklore),15 and geographical indications (GIs)16 as problems in the
10 See Int’l Order of Job’s Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 919 (9th
Cir. 1980) (“A trademark owner has a property right only insofar as is necessary to
prevent consumer confusion as to who produced the goods and to facilitate differentiation of the trademark owner’s goods.”).
11 One Indus., LLC v. Jim O’Neal Distrib., Inc., 578 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir.
2009) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t
Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999)).
12 Compare Justin Hughes, “Recoding” Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience
Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923 (1999) (describing audience interest in fixed forms of
copyrighted works), with Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement
and the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1993) (rejecting the idea of the
unmodifiable creative work).
13 See, e.g., JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES (1999).
14 See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (2006) (noting that copyright subsists only in fixed
works); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (describing the disclosure requirements imposed on
patent applicants). Patent law demands only conception of an invention, not actual
construction of an embodiment, but treats the filing of a valid patent application as
“constructive” reduction to practice. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 60–61
(1998) (emphasizing conception); Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802
F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (describing constructive reduction to practice).
15 See Margaret Chon, Global Intellectual Property Governance (Under Construction), 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 349, 367 (2011). The Intergovernmental Committee on
Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore
(IGC) of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has been working for
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preservation of knowledge has not, in the main, been broadened to
offer insight into problems of knowledge generally. TK and TCE discussions have exposed important insights into the meaning of tradition and preservation within specific communities,17 and into the
challenges of defining and governing interfaces between people,
processes and knowledge inside TK, TCE, and folkloric communities,
and people, processes, and knowledge outside them.
The result of this blend of approaches is a curious omission in the
law of knowledge. Intangible forms of knowledge are addressed as
questions of novelty and creativity; tangible forms of knowledge are
addressed as questions of fixity and preservation. Folkloric and traditional knowledge are approached as problems in authenticity.18 If
“tangible/intangible” and “static/dynamic” form the ranges of a twoby-two matrix, then two boxes of that matrix have received less generalized attention from scholars than they should. Dynamism in tangible
thing-ness is one such box; it is just starting to be addressed.19 Here, I
introduce a conversation regarding the second: the preservation and
conservation of intangible knowledge, or knowledge curation. Could
and should the law do more—more than what it does now in the context of intellectual property law—to preserve intangible forms of creativity and innovation produced by prior generations? We are missing
a good affirmative account of the mechanics of curating the products
many years on a text-based instrument (or instruments) for the effective protection of
traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions, and genetic resources. The
IGC website collects background documents, working documents, and the text of the
IGC’s current mandate. See Intergovernmental Committee, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/igc/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). James Boyle pointed
out long ago that Western models of intellectual property, which focus on innovation
and creativity, are poorly suited to broader source-based interests in reputation, privacy, and control represented in traditional cultural forms. See JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 127–28 (1996).
16 See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299 (2006).
17 On the complex character of claims to authenticity on behalf of communities
and artistic traditions, see, for example, DANIEL BARENBOIM & EDWARD W. SAID, PARALLELS AND PARADOXES: EXPLORATIONS IN MUSIC AND SOCIETY (Ara Guzelimian ed.,
2002); BENJAMIN FILENE, ROMANCING THE FOLK: PUBLIC MEMORY AND AMERICAN ROOTS
MUSIC (2000); Eric Hobsbawm, Introduction: Inventing Traditions, in THE INVENTION OF
TRADITION 1 (Eric Hobsbawm & Terence Ranger eds., 1983).
18 See Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 513–16 (2001).
19 See Michael J. Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 381 (2005); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96
GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
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of the mind. I propose to offer an introductory account of those
mechanics. I ground that account in the idea of cultural commons.
Commons, as I use the term here, refers to institutional arrangements for sharing resources, grounded in law but heavily dependent
on history and practice. Commons are neither essentially public nor
private. Commons are neither perfectly free, open, and fluid nor necessarily static and fixed. Commons are governance, bounded by discipline but complex and pluralistic in orientation.
The article unfolds in the following way. Part I illustrates the idea
of knowledge curation. Part II describes the mismatch between the
three principal intellectual property regimes and knowledge curation.
Part III offers a brief diversion on the question of piracy. Part IV
describes cultural commons as a framework for describing curation.
Part V points to continuing challenges for commons as an approach
to knowledge curation.
I. WHY KNOWLEDGE CURATION MATTERS
Knowledge curation is a dialogue among interests in stability and
dynamism in cultural objects and practices. The center of analysis is
to-and-fro20 rather than control, or governance rather than ownership. If production of the creative and innovative “new” constitutes
the dominant “to” of IP policy, then preservation and conservation of
the known “old” might be said to be the “fro.” Society needs durable,
fixed intangible things both because society itself needs to be largely
stable and fixed, and because it also needs those durable, fixed things
precisely so that it can change them, and change itself.21 Society
needs the old, and law and policy often (but not always) should promote and protect the old, in order to make sense of social interests in
the new.22 The critic Walter Benjamin referred to collecting as a
“renewal of existence” and as renewal of the old world.23 Society also
needs the old in order to understand its own past, that is, to under20 See Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1151, 1190–91 (2007) (describing the idea of “creative play”).
21 See Amy M. Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 263, 270–71 (2009).
22 Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 580–81 (1994) (noting that a parodist has to mimic the original in order to make its point), with Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451–52 (1984) (differentiating “librarying” from “time-shifting” when consumers use videotape recorders).
23 See Walter Benjamin, Ich packe meine Bibliothek aus, [Unpacking My Library], DIE
LITERARISCHE WELT [THE LITERARY WORLD], July 1931 (Ger.), translated in 2 WALTER
BENJAMIN: SELECTED WRITINGS 486, 487 (Michael W. Jennings et al. eds., Rodney Livingstone et al. trans., 1999).
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stand its own history. Knowledge curation is valuable both instrumentally and in itself.
The phrase knowledge curation can be defined analytically,24 but it
is best illustrated by examples. The analytic claim begins with knowledge, which encompasses not only creative and new works but also old
material, facts, and ideas, in their conversational as well as legal
senses. Facts, ideas, and laws of nature are part of the law of knowledge even if they are excluded from copyright and patent protection.
I focus on knowledge to distinguish knowledge as the subject of law and
policy from creativity as an attribute of the human psyche.25 Knowledge
is external; it is embodied in objects and practices and may include
things that are not innovative or creative. Its external character means
that knowledge is inescapably social in character. Creativity, as scholars and analysts frequently use the word, refers to an attribute of the
human mind.26 That is not my interest here.
Curation deals with a cluster of concepts: preservation, collection,
evaluation, and presentation of things. I choose the term over the
more mundane term management (or the vivid but less rich term hus-

24 This phrase appears to have had limited traction to date in organizational science and no traction in legal scholarship.
25 My terminology here blends two arguments. In part I wish to include in this
review things that are excluded from copyright and patent law on the ground that
they are “ideas” or “facts,” even though in a meaningful sense they are the products of
human cognition. “Knowledge” in this sense embraces all manner of ways of knowing
the world, including both “creativity” (that is, for example, copyrightable “expression”) and “ideas,” in their copyright sense, patent sense, and nonlegal sense. In part
I wish to distinguish my perspective from arguments that the “creativity” of interest to
law and policy is “creativity” found inside one’s imagination. As the contribution by
Keith Sawyer to this Symposium makes clear, “creativity” is often wrongly viewed solely
as an inner state, a character trait, or an attribute of personality. Psychological
research suggests that creativity lies at least as much in the making as in the thinking,
that is, creativity exists at the intersection of the person and the environment. See,
e.g., ROBERT J. STERNBERG ET AL., THE CREATIVITY CONUNDRUM (2002); R. Keith Sawyer, The Western Cultural Model of Creativity: Its Influence on Intellectual Property Law, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2027 (2011).
In part I also distinguish my perspective from arguments that “knowledge”
should be characterized by its contrast with mere “information,” as a power or capacity rather than as an object-ified (if necessarily evolving) “thing.” See Amy Kapczynski,
Introduction, ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle
Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds., 2010), at 46. In my view “knowledge” includes not
only things but also practices, ways of knowing, and tools and capabilities.
26 Or soul. See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 147–53 (2010).
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bandry27) largely because of how the word evokes interests in the
semantic content of works of knowledge, or its value, rather than
knowledge as an abstract thing.28 Curation combines history and education. Curators are preservationists, among other things, and they
are also teachers. Knowledge curation refers to the idea that knowledge
itself, as an intangible, passes from place to place, from person to person, from group to group, and from generation to generation under a
set of material conditions that can be defined and understood and
that preserves the identity of that knowledge even if it is also changed,
extended, or adapted. The puzzle of what lasts and why has been considered by art historians, who focus on the character of influence and
reputation in the longevity of art.29 I suggest that the puzzle is generalizable, and that it should be explored in the context of legal rules
and related institutions.
Examples help. There are works and practices whose preservation now matters and has mattered deeply to modern, Western culture but whose survival owes differing amounts of debt to various
intellectual property systems. The question to consider is the role of
intellectual property law and the role of other law and policy choices,
and other social and cultural choices, in the survival of these things in
something approaching their original forms.
• Homeric poetry, which survived for generations via oral tradition before the invention of writing (as Plato, interpreting Socrates, lamented),30 let alone the invention of intellectual
property law.
• Shakespearean poetry, and particularly his plays, which were
produced for performance and only recorded in published

27 See JOHN SEELY BROWN & PAUL DUGUID, THE SOCIAL LIFE OF INFORMATION 147
(2000) (referring the flow of knowledge in an ecological sense, among individuals,
firms, networks, and communities of practice).
28 The word itself is derived from the Latin curatore, meaning caretaker, and in
ancient Rome referred to those in charge of preserving order with respect to public
works, public supplies, or public administration.
29 See HOWARD S. BECKER, ART WORLDS (1982) (describing the question of “what
lasts?” in terms that are necessarily connected to questions of quality and judgment).
30 Plato’s lament, in Phaedrus, is recounted in NEIL POSTMAN, TECHNOPOLY: THE
SURRENDER OF CULTURE TO TECHNOLOGY 3–5 (1992). See also NICHOLAS CARR, THE
SHALLOWS 54–56 (2010). Maryanne Wolf offers a nuanced account of Socrates’s
objections to writing, focusing on its impact on human development, on memory,
and on personal autonomy. See MARYANNE WOLF, PROUST AND THE SQUID: THE STORY
AND SCIENCE OF THE READING BRAIN 69–79 (2007).
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form after Shakespeare’s death, prior to the invention of modern copyright in 1710.31
The microscope, a much-studied scientific device developed
outside the imperatives of modern patenting.32
Coca-Cola, both formula and brand, an example of the intersection of trade secret and trademark law and also of the influence of the commercial imperatives of a competitive market on
cultural fixation.33
Home-based performance of musical compositions, or the
practices whose disappearance was lamented by John Philip
Sousa upon the popularization of the gramophone.34 Cultural
practices as well as cultural things are at stake, and not all relevant objects of study are things that have in fact persisted. This
one did not.
The Internet Archive, a private resource that has been taking
periodic “snapshots” of the World Wide Web since 1996 and
storing them and making them available to the public online
since that time, as well as hosting collections of digital content.35 One collection in particular has received quite a bit of
attention in the legal literature: audience recordings and

31 See STEPHEN GREENBLATT, WILL IN THE WORLD: HOW SHAKESPEARE BECAME
SHAKESPEARE 18 (2004). The first modern copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,
dates from 1710. See An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the Copies of Printer Books in the Authors or Purchasers of Such Copies, During the Times
Therein Mentioned, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
32 Other scientific and technological advances might serve at least as well here.
Consider such fundamental and enduring inventions as the steam engine, the airplane, the telephone, the elevator, the automobile, the Internet, the telescope, the
chlorination of drinking water, penicillin, X-rays, and the polio vaccine. Invented
technical standards, such as the meter and the periodic table of the elements, also
offer useful illustrations. See Mario Biagioli, From Print to Patents: Living on Instruments
in Early Modern Europe, 44 HIST. OF SCI. 139 (2006).
33 See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 407–08 (E.D. Pa. 1942) (finding that Coca-Cola had acquired rights in the term “Coke” by virtue of public use of
the term); Barton Beebe, Intellectual Property Law and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 809, 824 (2010) (“[A] brand can become so ubiquitous, can exist in so many
copies, that its very ubiquity is the basis of its perceived rarity—if not quite famous for
being famous, the brand Coca-Cola is distinctive, if not unique, for its unrivalled
ubiquity.”).
34 Sousa’s reaction to recording technology was made the focus of a contemporary argument about popular remixing of commercial culture in LAWRENCE LESSIG,
REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008) and
Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 298 (2004). See
John Philip Sousa, The Menace of Mechanical Music, APPLETON’S MAG., Sept. 1906, at
278.
35 See INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
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soundboard recordings from Grateful Dead concerts.36 One
cannot relive the experience of participating in a Grateful
Dead concert, but one can hear what fans in a particular concert hall heard on one particular night.
In each of these examples, the content is of interest, not the
container. In one way or another, these are forms of knowledge,
rather than creativity or innovation as such.
I am conscious here that I focus on objects themselves rather
than on the people who might have an interest in them, now, in the
past, or in the future. With Shakespeare, we care about the First
Folio, but the plays themselves are the relevant things, and the fact
that they fell into the public domain relatively quickly after the production of the First Folio is little help as such in understanding their
relative durability.37 Yet the enduring character of Shakespeare’s
works is itself as essential to contemporary culture as the modern
works constructed from them: West Side Story;38 Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead;39 and the performances of Sir Laurence Olivier.40
Without modern knowledge of Homeric poetry, later authors could
not have produced—nor audiences enjoyed—Virgil’s Aeneid, Dante’s
Divine Comedy, Cervantes’s Don Quixote, Joyce’s Ulysses, and even the
Coen brothers’ O Brother, Where Art Thou?41 Knowledge represented
by modern art is no less significant. In the throwaway modern romantic comedy You’ve Got Mail, the protangonist (Joe Fox) reminds his
love interest: “The Godfather is the I Ching. The Godfather is the sum of
all wisdom. The Godfather is the answer to any question,”42 a statement
that illustrates the enduring character of an ancient classic Chinese
text, the enduring character of a modern classic film, and the thesis of
this Article. Access rules in modern intellectual property law enable
36 See Grateful Dead, INTERNET ARCHIVE, http://www.archive.org/details/Grateful
Dead (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). The relevant legal scholarship is Mark F. Schultz,
Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About Persuading People to
Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006).
37 I do not mean to overstate the degree to which modern scholars have been
able to identify a single canonical version of any given play attributed to Shakespeare.
38 ARTHUR LAURENTS ET AL., WEST SIDE STORY (1958) (music by Leonard Bernstein and lyrics by Stephen Sondheim).
39 TOM STOPPARD, ROSENCRANTZ & GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD (1966).
40 Sir Laurence Olivier starred in film adaptations of HAMLET (Two Cities Films
1948), HENRY V (Two Cities Films 1944), RICHARD III (London Film Productions
1955), and AS YOU LIKE IT (Inter-Allied Film Producers Ltd. 1936). He also appeared
on stage in London and New York in numerous productions of The Bard’s works. See
TERRY COLEMAN, OLIVIER (2005).
41 O BROTHER, WHERE ART THOU? (Touchstone Pictures 2000).
42 YOU’VE GOT MAIL (Warner Bros. Pictures 1998).
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the producers of You’ve Got Mail to use references to the I Ching and
The Godfather, but curation requires preservation and evaluation as
well as access. Society, or at least some populations in society, need
and want the I Ching and The Godfather to be curated. Over time and
as a result of kinds of curation, both works were elevated to the roles
that they played in You’ve Got Mail, in a bit of none-too-cute
Hollywood self-reference.
II. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

AND

CURATION MARKETS

Intellectual property law is the standard model for understanding
how social interests in knowledge are translated into law.43 That
model privatizes knowledge interests as IP rights in order to form
financial and labor markets in them; in principle, encouraging the
exchange and transfer of those rights in private transactions promotes
social welfare. By biasing that system in favor of new knowledge (creative production in copyright, innovative production in patent, distinctive production in trademark), that standard model either excludes
from consideration policy problems that bear on durable but intangible cultural objects, or it treats those problems as narrow and exceptional, or both. The normative fabric of intellectual property law is
heavily invested in progress, in the many ways in which that concept
might be defined.44 It is not invested, much, in stasis. This Part offers
a brief overview of the elements of IP regimes that bear on knowledge
curation, and their inadequacies. My emphasis here is on doctrine as
doctrine and its relative independence from social, economic, or
other institutional context.
A. Theoretical Perspectives
The standard IP model is based on an incentive to produce/
access for reuse paradigm based on private rights, which is intended
to address (or that has evolved in response to) a so-called “tragedy of
the commons,” overuse of an open resource pool of nonrival, nonexcludable “public goods,” such as knowledge or information resources,
43 Intellectual property law is not the only model, of course; alternatives are wellknown—public subsidies, public provision, patronage, and norm-based systems chief
among them—but they are neither widely used nor, importantly, currently deemed to
be of sizable theoretical import. I return to alternatives in Part IV below.
44 A current effort to recalibrate “progress” for the benefit of future generations
is Brett M. Frischmann & Mark P. McKenna, Intergenerational Progress, 2011 WIS. L.
REV. 123.
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that leads to its depletion.45 Creativity and innovation law privatize
knowledge production in order to (mostly) align internal incentives
to produce and consume with external costs that consist of underproduction and overconsumption. Knowledge spillovers, which impact
people and groups other than those who are party to bilateral transactions in IP rights, are presumptively characterized as harmful (and
unlawful).46 In that framework, durable intangible knowledge as such is
likely not to be underproduced, because the law is likely to respond
most strongly to protect investment in works that are most likely to
last, other things being equal.47 By definition, the production problem is resolved by the presence of IP rights. And even if intangible
durability might be underproduced, durable intangible knowledge is
not overconsumed, such that a better (and higher) price for durability
is appropriate and uncompensated spillovers internalized by the producer. That result follows from either or both of two lines of reasoning. First, economically, the present value of future claims to
preserved knowledge may be nominal or even zero, which means that
using IP rules grounded on public goods thinking, to encourage present producers to internalize the costs of curation spillovers for the
benefit of future generations, is unlikely to be effective.48 Second,
consumption itself tends to breed a work’s influence and reputation—
precisely the things that positively influence durability of the work.
Alleged overconsumption therefore constitutes a positive spillover for
which the producer need not be compensated, rather than a negative
spillover to be eliminated.49
45

See Michael J. Madison, Brett M. Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, CONCOMMONS IN THE CULTURAL ENVIRONMENT, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 666,
675 (2010).
46 See Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257,
267 (2007).
47 See Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars on the “Information Superhighway”: Authors,
Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1499 (1995) (emphasizing role of copyright law in encouraging the production of “sustained” works); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL
STUD. 325, 331–32 (1989) (arguing that IP rights are addressed to durable, as
opposed to ephemeral, works).
48 See ELDRED V. ASHCROFT, 537 U.S. 186, 254–56 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(citing arguments by leading economists that the present value of an extension of the
copyright term into the distant future is likely to have minimal impact on authors’
decisions to create new works). See generally Deven R. Desai, Property, Persona, and
Preservation, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (2008) (reviewing limits on justifications for longterm creator control of their creations); Justin Hughes, Fair Use Across Time, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 775 (2003) (noting the limited economic justifications for fair use as time
passes after initial acts of creation).
49 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 46, at 257–58.
STRUCTING
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In the abstract, therefore, a public goods model of IP rights can
be mapped onto legal rights that permit (if not encourage) knowledge curation. But in practice, the fit is awkward. The mapping that I
lay out above treats spillovers of any type as intentionally rare or narrow or both. Courts and Congress agree. For example, literal, verbatim copying of copyrighted or patented cultural works ordinarily is
treated as infringing because it undermines a typical market for IP
rights, but some such copying might can be justified as a positive spillover because it is part of an account of the law’s treatment of conservation of intangibles. Copying might be characterized as an act of
personal expression (a personal act of creating influence based on
taste, for example)50 or as a legitimate act of consumption of creative
work (assisting acts of memory of particular works),51 but courts have
been reluctant to extend the narrow exemptions for these practices
that Congress has offered.52 Instead, in practice, spillover questions
related to knowledge curation have been pushed out of the intangible
context altogether and are resolved primarily through a lens dominated by ownership and control of the relevant tangible object that
embodies the work. Copying might be justified as part of and therefore used to enable a practice of collecting and archiving tangible artifacts. This move works theoretically, because the core intangible
public goods model is largely undisturbed. Copyright law accommodates the curatorial interests of library and archive patrons at the price
of extraordinarily detailed regulation that contrasts starkly with the
broad, general rights afforded copyright owners.53 The result remains
narrow, and the knowledge curation benefit is achieved only indirectly, via tangible property curation.
If the public goods model does not fully explain the role of IP
rights in knowledge curation, then one might move theoretically to a
form of intellectual property pluralism, in which the several bodies of
IP law are not linked so profoundly to a single underlying construct.
50 See generally Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004) (arguing that copying serves,
among other things, to promote self-expression).
51 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984).
52 See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2006) (offering a limited exception to infringement liability for making certain noncommercial musical recordings). That section was given
a limited reading by the Ninth Circuit in A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1024 (9th Cir. 2001).
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 108 (2006); infra note 134 and accompanying text. Copyright
privileges for libraries and archives are discussed at length in Menell, supra note 7, at
1034–38. Some argue that copyright law has not been sizable barrier, in practice, to
the creation of digital archives. See Peter B. Hirtle, Undue Diligence?, 34 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 55 (2010).
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Public goods welfarism is not the only value at stake in IP systems; IP
law is concerned primarily with new knowledge, but it also touches on
a number of related but distinct questions concerning the content of
any given form of knowledge, including questions of identity, authenticity, cultural value, access, community, and authorial reputation,54
grounded not in economic reasoning but in ethics55 and justice.56 In
contemporary law, these concepts are typically associated with systems
of trademark law, with moral rights, with private licensing systems
such as Creative Commons and open source licenses and databases,57
with efforts to protect traditional knowledge,58 and with norm-based
regimes grounded more in community or public morality than in economic incentives.59 In bits and pieces, these frameworks can do some
of the work of knowledge curation; in Part IV, below, I explore how
they might be assembled into a broader whole. But none of them can
do all of the work necessary to explain how IP rights connect to knowledge curation. Identity, authenticity, and reputation interests represented in the several doctrines of moral rights are tied primarily to
personality, identity, and dignity interests of the human author,60
rather than interests in preserving knowledge as such. Collective
licensing schemes, norm-based systems, and the like are founded on
questions of communal identity and distributive justice. Knowledge
curation may be a happy by-product of these things, but it is a byproduct nonetheless. Efforts to protect access, identity, and authenticity interests for the benefit of successive generations turn out to be
54 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006); infra notes 138–39 and accompanying text. See
generally Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353 (2006)
(discussing moral rights in copyright law).
55 See generally Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993)
(describing the appropriate boundaries of Lockean analysis of intellectual property
rights).
56 See generally Madhavi Sunder, IP 3, 59 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2006) (applying the
capabilities approach of Amartya Sen to information law questions).
57 See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text.
58 See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97 (2007). Those efforts increasingly blend sui generis strategies with
efforts to leverage enabling and disabling provisions of collective licensing (such that
access to the contents of a traditional knowledge database may be conditioned on
compliance with knowledge-conserving terms) and patent law (such that the contents
of the database may be deemed to be relevant prior art against inventions grounded
in knowledge that the database contains). Relevant examples include the Traditional
Chinese Medicine Patents Database, the Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, and
the Traditional Ecological Knowledge Prior Art Database.
59 See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
60 See generally Rigamonti, supra note 54.
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at least equally focused on efforts to protect the post-production interests of prior-generation creators, whether those creators are individuated, as in the case of Western copyright authors or patent inventors,
or communal, as in the case of traditional knowledge regimes.
Turning briefly away from IP theories, one might search for legal
rationales for knowledge curation in other legal regimes. Durability
of objects is the question posed by tangible property law and specialized subsets of property law, such as art law.61 The challenge here is
the relatively value-independent position that the law takes relative to
the knowledge content of the objects. Generalized tangible property
regimes typically assign to intellectual property law the value of the
intangible expression or innovation expressed in a particular object or
collection of objects. Property law is concerned primarily with the
abstract idea of possession and/or control of the thing, or with questions of obligation and trust rather than value.62 Art law and cultural
property (or cultural heritage) law specifically addresses the issue of
preservation of knowledge as such, but only so long as knowledge is
embodied in particular sites and objects.63 More important, unlike
intellectual property law, tangible property law typically offers little in
the way of default rules of access that ensure that the intangible
knowledge represented in art and artifacts can be studied, used, and
re-used by later generations except within the context of particular
community settings, or particular bilateral (i.e., assent or need-based)
relationships.64
61 In addition to SAX, supra note 13, see Michael J. Madison, Creativity and Craft,
in CREATIVITY, LAW, AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Shubha Ghosh & Robin Paul Malloy eds.,
forthcoming 2011) (describing the attitude of copyright law relative to artisanal
creativity).
62 This point was brought home to copyright lawyers in the context of Cmty. for
Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989). A sculptor settled a case with an
organization that hired him to create a sculpture; the agreement confirmed copyright
ownership in the sculptor and ownership of the sculpture itself in the organization.
The parties returned to court after the organization denied the sculptor access to his
sculpture for purposes of making reproductions. The court fashioned an equitable
remedy that allowed the sculptor what the court characterized as akin to ‘‘an implied
easement of necessity’’ to enable him to exercise his rights under the settlement. See
Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 1991 WL 415523, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 7, 1991).
63 See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 245
(2006) (describing international framework for protection of cultural heritage objects
and sites).
64 See generally Cortelyou C. Kenney, Reframing Indigenous Cultural Artifacts Disputes: An Intellectual Property-Based Approach, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 527–34
(2011) (describing limits of cultural property law as applied to questions of knowledge and representation in tangible artifacts); Lauren McBrayer & John J. Steele, The

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-5\NDL508.txt

1972

unknown

Seq: 16

notre dame law review

17-NOV-11

11:06

[vol. 86:5

Because the knowledge forms at stake are intangible, by my definition, and because IP forms are the default forms of legal regulation
of knowledge intangibles, in the next section I review the efforts and
inadequacies of the three major bodies of IP doctrine with respect to
knowledge curation.
B. Copyright and Curation
Copyright doctrine offers a number of rules that relate to curating intangible creativity. The law distinguishes between idea and protected expression, leaving the former available and formally available
for reuse.65 Under the doctrines of merger and scenes à faire, the law
limits protection for and assures use of material that becomes a kind
of cultural standard.66 Duration rules are important. Formally, at
least, copyright expires and every copyrighted work eventually enters
the public domain,67 meaning that anyone is legally entitled to exploit
it commercially—in its original form, as well as in modified form. A
decade ago, a debate was fought over extensions to the term of copyright principally on the ground that term extension was needed to
encourage proprietors of older works to preserve and redistribute
them; opposers denied that this incentive mechanism would operate
as described, or at all, and that preservation interests would be better
served by limiting copyright’s term rather than extending it.68 The
distinction between copyrighted works of authorship and their fixed
forms,69 and the first sale doctrine as a defense to infringement of
distribution rights, ensure that tangible objects that embody copyrighted works live a marketable life.70 Copyright law offers special
protections to libraries and archives that engage in specified forms of
Art of Deaccession: An Ethical Perspective (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Mar. 30 to Apr. 1,
2005), available at SK061 ALI-ABA 339 (describing ethical framework that surrounds
museums’ decisions to remove objects from their collections).
65 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
66 See Coquico, Inc. v. Rodrı́guez-Miranda, 562 F.3d 62, 68 (1st Cir. 2009).
67 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–304.
68 The Supreme Court eventually upheld the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act against constitutional challenge, despite expressing some skepticism that
Congress had made a wise policy judgment. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 222
(2003). Subsequent research by Paul Heald suggests that concerns that public
domain works would be underexploited may be misplaced. See Paul J. Heald, Does the
Song Remain the Same? An Empirical Study of Bestselling Musical Compositions (1913–1932)
and Their Use in Cinema (1968–2007), 60 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009). In my
terms, his point is that permitting works to enter the public domain is a plausible
knowledge curation strategy.
69 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
70 See id. § 109.
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reproduction for archival and preservation purposes.71 Creating and
publishing indexes to copyrighted works and offering search technologies and finding tools are acts that are often protected in copyright,
though not universally, as fair use or under safe harbors from potential contributory or vicarious liability.72 Certain applications of the
adaptation right, and certain forms of moral right—primarily the
right to maintain the integrity of the work—offer protection to cultural heritage interests rather than or in addition to protection for
authors’ interests.73 Historical and critical practices, privileged within
the doctrine of fair use,74 preserve the identities of their objects.
With two salient and important exceptions, for the most part,
copyright law does little more regarding knowledge curation than put
legal structures in place to permit curation, rather than encourage it.
On the whole, copyright eschews judgments about cultural worth,
whether new or old, via what is often referred to as an aesthetic nondiscrimination principle.75 Copyright’s treatment of the idea/expression distinction is representative. “Ideas” are not protected by
copyright, so that readers, consumers, and later authors may use
them, along with the rest of the public domain, for further creative
production.76 What counts as an “idea” in copyright terms, and therefore what is presumptively entitled to the weight of the law’s interest
in preservation for further use, is subject to the vagaries of judicial
interpretation during litigation, provided that accused infringers
undertake to challenge the distinction; neither creators nor other
copyright institutions are obliged legally to define their “ideas” ex
ante.77 From a social standpoint, however, the expression embodied
in a given work of authorship is often far more worthy of curation
than the work’s “idea.” Today we value the expression of Shakespeare
at least as much as we value his “ideas,” and perhaps more so; many
Shakespearean plots were derived from sources that were old even in
71 See id. § 108.
72 See id. § 512; Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc. 487 F.3d 701, 725 (9th Cir.
2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003).
73 See Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art Found., Inc. v. Büchel, 593
F.3d 38, 56–63 (1st Cir. 2010) (dealing with the right of integrity under the Visual
Artists Rights Act); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 25–26 (2d Cir. 1976)
(directing entry of preliminary injunction against broadcast of modified versions of
plaintiffs’ works).
74 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
75 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 244 (1903).
76 See Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 968, 992–93 (1990).
77 Id. at 973–74.
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the time of Elizabeth I and James I.78 Copyright thus entrusts curation of creative knowledge to the copyright owner during the term of
copyright, as part and parcel of the owner’s market-based exclusive
rights, and to the public afterward, in a binary that makes a certain
degree of sense only from the standpoint of the production of new
things. With respect to old things, the market is assigned an even
greater role. As a matter of copyright law, knowledge curation in the
public domain remains market-based. Some works attract private
investment despite the absence of exclusive rights; some works attract
public investment by the state if they are deemed worthy of state support;79 and some works attract idiosyncratic interest by individuals,
communities, and organizations as collectors or archivists. None of
that activity, however, is modeled by the copyright system.
The first salient exception is the idea that copyright subsists only
in works “fixed in a tangible medium of expression,”80 a phrase that
was added to the American Copyright Act during the revision enacted
in 1976. Fixation is important culturally for all kinds of reasons having to do with the operation of the contemporary copyright system; it
is important historically because tangible manuscripts were the original “copies” that were the subjects of printing privileges supervised by
the Stationers’ Company in 16th and 17th century England.81 Tangibility, or fixation, allows the copyright owner, courts, and the Copyright Office to determine that a work of authorship was created and
what that work was. It supports social interests in the distribution of
copies of copyrighted works. From the standpoint of knowledge curation, fixation creates tangible things that curatorial interests work
with, in public and private libraries, archives, maps, and collections of
knowledge—provided that later generations have access to these
78

See generally ROBERT S. MIOLA, SHAKESPEARE AND CLASSICAL COMEDY: THE INFLUPLAUTUS AND TERENCE (1994); ROBERT S. MIOLA, SHAKESPEARE AND CLASSICAL
TRAGEDY: THE UNFLUENCE OF SENECA (1992).
79 For example, the National Film Registry of the Library of Congress selects culturally significant American films to be preserved for future generations. See National
Film Preservation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1774, 1782; National Film
Preservation Board, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, http://www.loc.gov/film (last visited Sept.
21, 2011).
80 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). Under the definition provided in § 101, “[a]
work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or
stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a
period of more than transitory duration.” Id. § 101.
81 See ADRIAN JOHNS, PIRACY: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WARS FROM GUTENBERG
TO GATES 25–27 (2009).
ENCE OF
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things.82 But access to tangible things is the missing link of copyright
doctrine as knowledge curation. Because fixed forms of copyrighted
works are forms of tangible or chattel property to which copyright, by
design, does not apply, and because copyright mandates access to
works of authorship only grudgingly—and then only to works within
its scope83—one cannot trace this piece of copyright doctrine fully
through to a policy of knowledge curation. The fixation requirement
reminds us that copyright is not entirely divorced from idea that curation of past creativity is among the many goals of the law. Parties who
would conserve relevant knowledge need access rights based on some
other source.
The second salient exception is, indirectly, a form of access and
therefore directly a part of copyright as knowledge curation: the
requirement that owners of copyrights in published works deposit two
copies of the work with the Library of Congress.84 The deposit
requirement was added to the American copyright statute in 184685
but had ample precedent in English and European experience—
though publishers and printers resisted, at times mightily, the idea
that they should be compelled to subsidize what they perceived as
their competitors via mandatory provision of free books.86 Fixation is
a historical contingency turned copyright policy; deposit, like copyright itself, comes to us as a negotiated equilibrium resolving claims of
authors, readers, publishers, and governments. Its value as a legal
82 Works of authorship created and/or preserved in digital form pose special
curatorial problems, both within copyright and outside of it. Within copyright, digital
works of authorship may not be permanently affixed to specific tangible media in the
way that ink is affixed to paper. Outside of copyright, access to digital knowledge—as
well as access to some forms of analog knowledge—typically requires access not only
to media that embodies the work but also access to technical architecture that supports “reading” or “playing” the work. I cannot play a CD on an iPod. I also cannot
play a Long-Playing record (LP) on a CD player or a videocassette on a BluRay player.
The challenges of digital curation and data curation have attracted numerous efforts
to study and solve them. See, e.g., INT’L J. DIGITAL CURATION, http://www.ijdc.net/
index.php/ijdc/index (last visited Sept. 21, 2011); Digital Preservation, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, http://www.digitalpreservation.gov/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2011). For a
particularly vivid example of an access problem concerning a ancient form of knowledge, see TOBY LESTER, THE FOURTH PART OF THE WORLD: THE RACE TO THE ENDS OF
THE EARTH, AND THE EPIC STORY OF THE MAP THAT GAVE AMERICA ITS NAME (2009),
describing the search for and recovery of the sixteenth-century Waldseemüller map.
83 I refer here to compulsory licensing, some forms of which count as species of
knowledge curation. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (compulsory license for cover
recordings).
84 See id. § 407.
85 See Menell, supra note 7, at 1022–28.
86 See JOHNS, supra note 81, at 215–20, 234–40.
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source of knowledge curation seems obvious today, but in fact
deposit’s role in curation, while critical, is tenuous. Deposit creates
the conditions for curation, but does not curate anything in itself.
Curation depends on a related but independent matrix of institutions
that house the deposits and make them available to members,
patrons, and at times, the public.87 I return to the role of those institutions in Part V.
C. Patents and Curation
Knowledge curation questions are not limited to works of art or
high culture, and in any case intersections and overlaps between the
subject matter of copyright and the subject matter of patent mean that
it is unhelpful to limit the conversation to the former. Patent law
offers a set of doctrinal and policy tools that focus on novelty and
innovation in rough proportion to copyright’s focus on creativity. But
the binary pattern described above with respect to copyright largely
repeats in patent law. Patentable inventions must be nonobvious and
novel.88 Patent is subject to a principle of technological neutrality89
that corresponds roughly to copyright’s aesthetic nondiscrimination
principle. Curatorial interests, as in copyright, are mostly negative.
Subject matter rules exclude laws of nature, abstract ideas, and mathematical formulae from patent protection—independent of their eligibility for consideration as nonobvious and novel inventions—in part
to protect later generations in their ability to use such presumably
unchanging things.90 As with copyright law, patent term rules free
inventions from exclusive control and deliver them to the public marketplace. Curation of public domain inventions is, in practice, handled on the same terms and in ways comparable to curation of works
that occupy copyright’s public domain.
Like copyright law, patent law has some important exceptional
rules that bear on curation. In patent law, the chief bearer of an
affirmative knowledge curation policy is a meta-concept: the idea of
the art. In American law, patent is concerned with the “useful Arts,”91
and the idea of the art, or technical discipline, occupies a central role
87 The idea of the free public library in the United States can be traced to the
founding of the Library Company of Philadelphia, in 1731, by Benjamin Franklin and
others. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 56–57 (2002).
88 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103.
89 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, art. 27(1).
90 These are “part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men. . . . free to all men
and reserved exclusively to none.” Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
91 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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in a number of patent rules, most importantly the scope of the relevant prior “art” for nonobviousness and determinations.92 In addition, the domain of the artisan to whom the invention must be
adequately disclosed is part of the enablement inquiry.93 The idea of
the useful arts might play a central role in the concept of patentable
subject matter, although the Supreme Court has (for the time being)
not followed that path.94 The “art” is the legal and social custodian of
the accumulated knowledge of the relevant field and the bearer of its
history in legal proceedings before the Patent Office and in a
courtroom.
In one additional respect, knowledge curation in the context of
patent law overlaps with knowledge curation in the context of copyright law. Patentees are subject to a disclosure obligation.95 The
invention must be fully “enabled” in the specification that forms part
of the final patent document so that the public has the benefit of the
knowledge that constitutes the innovation, in exchange for the limited rights granted by the patent itself.96 Within the conventions of
patenting, patent specifications turn patentable machines, processes,
and compounds into copyrightable, and durable, text. Patent prior
art, compiled in public, searchable archives, is itself an institutional
mechanism for preserving technological heritage, sustained to a large
part by a specific part of the bargain that is at the heart of modern
patent law.97 All of this, of course, feeds existing copyright-style argu92 See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (“A patent may not be obtained though the
invention is not identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.”). The America Invents Act of 2011 amends this section,
changing the relevant time from “the time the invention was made” to “the effective
filing date of the claimed invention.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No.
112-29, § 3(e), 125 Stat. 284–341 (2011).
93 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
94 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218
(2010), avoided relying on the idea of useful “arts” as an outer boundary on patenteligible subject matter. Justice Stevens and three other concurring Justices felt otherwise, although their discussion of the meaning of the “arts” as a substantive guide to
modern law left much to be desired. See Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3242–45 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
95 See In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 735.
96 See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
97 See generally Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009 (2008) (discussing the role of patent law in the codification
of knowledge). Some prominent critics have characterized this as a vice of patenting,
rather than a virtue. The scientist and philosopher Michael Polanyi regarded science
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ments about access to representations of knowledge in libraries,
archives, museums, collections, and databases.
D. Trademarks and Curation
Copyright and patent law do not exhaust relevant IP disciplines
relevant to curatorial questions. Trademark law plays an important
role as well, although trademark law bears an imperfect relationship
(and perhaps a nonexistent relationship) to public goods models of
innovation and IP law. Trademark law is regarded as having little to
do with innovation or creativity of any kind; instead, it is a limited
form of consumer protection and unfair competition law.98 But trademark protection increasingly offers innovators a useful appropriation
mechanism to respond to public goods concerns,99 notwithstanding
occasional efforts to limit recourse to multiple systems of intellectual
property protection for single innovations.100 Whatever its justification, however, trademark law includes doctrines that offer opportunities for the creation and curation of stable cultural meaning.101
The fact that trademark protection does not expire so long as the
mark owner continues to use the mark102 means that trademark offers
mark owners powerful incentives to curate their marks and the knowledge that they represent, should they choose to do so. Trademark
protection increases in strength in rough proportion to successful
efforts by mark owners to cultivate goodwill among the consuming
public, including efforts to police infringing use of the mark by rivals
itself as a tradition embedded in practices and norms of its practitioners (“tacit knowledge”) and therefore antithetical to the rationalizing and ordering imperatives of patenting. See JOHNS, supra note 81, at 416–21. Polanyi argued that patenting should be
replaced by comprehensive state subsidies specifically targeted to the demonstrated
social value of innovation. See id.
98 See Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1840 (2007).
99 See Deven R. Desai, A Brand Theory of Trademark Law (unpublished manuscript
on file with author).
100 See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003)
(limiting overlap between copyright and trademark rights); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v.
Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001) (limiting overlap between patent and
trademark rights).
101 See generally Beebe, supra note 33 (describing the “sumptuary” nature of trademark doctrines that promote social stability).
102 See, e.g., Planetary Motion, Inc. v. Techplosion, Inc., 261 F.3d 1188, 1195 n.9
(11th Cir. 2001); Lucent Info. Mgmt., Inc. v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 186 F.3d 311, 317
(3d Cir. 1999).
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and efforts to monitor uses of their marks by licensees.103 Because
commercial signs and symbols evolve just as more typically knowledgebased works do, trademark law offers doctrines that reward owners of
such marks who invest in strategies to protect the continuity of a
mark’s commercial impression. As I noted at the outset of this article,
the priority of a valid mark will be sustained continuously through
those changes so long as the mark continues to make a substantially
identical commercial impression.104 Questions of identity and
authenticity of source and product, in the minds of consumers, are
central to that determination. Pepsi may change its house mark, as
Pepsi has done from time to time, yet Pepsi may keep the same priority of use associated with its original mark so long as consumers take
from the revised mark the understanding that the soda in the cans and
bottles bearing the new mark is substantially the “same” Pepsi, whose
quality is assured by the same entity, as soda in cans and bottles bearing the old mark.
The best thing that might be said of the doctrine of dilution in
trademark law is that it operates occasionally to protect investment in
branding and consumer expectations concerning signs and symbols in
the infrequent circumstance where protection is appropriate and
where confusion-based trademark law fails to do so—that is, dilution
may operate as a kind of curation backstop.105 Exclusions from trademark protection provide for the conservation and possible re-use by
consumers and competitors of symbols that amount to common or
collective cultural heritage: functional articles,106 generic terms,107
marks that have been abandoned or otherwise severed from appropriate goodwill,108 and marks that are subject to legitimate claims of fair
or nominative use.109 To the extent that trademarks are subject to
valid claims of free expression by critics, parodists, or rivals of mark
103 See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 366–67 (2d Cir.
1959).
104 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
105 See generally Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution
Law, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143 (2006) (describing dilution
doctrine).
106 See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(5) (2006); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514
U.S. 159, 164–65 (1995).
107 See, e.g., Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1989).
108 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining abandonment of a mark); FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 512 (9th Cir. 2010).
109 See, e.g., Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002); New Kids
on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 1992).
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owners, preservation of the identity and meaning of the mark is essential to the success of the speaker.110
Indirectly and taken together, these doctrines enforce a limited
form of knowledge curation within the domain of commercial marketing and branding. Trademark law covers some of the gaps left by copyright and patent law as knowledge curation, particularly to the extent
that trademark law actively encourages mark owners to actively invest
in curating their own marks in order to preserve a mark’s validity or
priority, and to the extent that in so doing, the law embraces questions of authenticity and identity. But trademark law has a limited
scope, at least formally, with respect to the types of knowledge that
marks represent: goodwill associated with commercial goods and services. And trademark’s curatorial function is left almost entirely to
the preferences of mark owners. Appropriation of their marks by consumers and competitors via the doctrine of “genericide” is actively
resisted; use of allegedly abandoned marks by competitors is
contested.
In sum, IP rights offer a useful introduction to the idea of the
relationship between law and knowledge curation, but there is clearly
much more to the story. Fleshing out that story begins in the next
Part, with a brief comment on the role of pirates.
III. INTERLUDE: PIRATE CURATORS
Piracy is an unconventional part of the concept of knowledge
curation and an unexpected if by now conventional part of IP law and
history. Its relevance, however, is this. Knowledge curation may be
grounded not in assertions of IP rights, nor in protection of the public
domain, but instead in the very concept of infringement. There are at
least two species of what we might call “pirate curators” to be
accounted for in a reconstituted description of knowledge curation.
First are pirate producers, institutions and practices that knowingly engage in acts of infringement by reproduction or distribution,
or at least, piracy (if not technical infringement) in order to extend
the life of cultural artifacts. The historian Adrian Johns describes the
lively market for reprinters in early America, importers and republishers of British material under copyright.111 The now standard account
of American copyright history relies on distribution of pirated copies
of British literature during the 19th century, which was lawful under
American law at the time but the subject of a great deal of anger and
110 See Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
264–65 (4th Cir. 2007).
111 See JOHNS, supra note 81, at 188–93.
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recrimination by British authors.112 Piratical reproductions of visual
art, particularly film, damage the bottom line of copyright owners but
extend the cultural lives of their products.113 Counterfeit shoes,
watches, and handbags simultaneously harm strong brands and reinforce their salience in the minds of consumers and in society
generally.
Second are pirate consumers. Johns notes the evolution of
broadcast licensing in England during the twentieth century in
response to “unauthorized reception” of radio signals.114 He rightly
connects that phenomenon and its cultural impact to the late twentieth century hacker culture and its impact on software development
and content distributed on the Internet.115 Pirates beget pirates beget
curation of content in the home and lab. “Liberating” digital music
and movies from rights-protection schemes can be treated, under
some circumstances, as acts of unauthorized cultural conservation,
particularly where critical, historical, and private or personal uses are
involved. In between these extremes lie practices such as “librarying”
recordings of broadcast television, recording television shows and
storing the recordings in an informal personal “library” or archive.
Such informal, broadly distributed consumer collection of knowledge
forms seems unquestionably to contribute to the preservation of certain cultural artifacts as forms of knowledge, yet it can be fairly
described under current law as infringing. The Supreme Court
described it as just that.116 “Librarying” has antecedents in more casual but nonetheless historically significant acts of piracy. The only
known extant recording of the final game of the 1960 World Series,
won by the Pittsburgh Pirates on a Game Seven, ninth-inning home
run by Bill Mazeroski, was discovered recently in a wine cellar once
owned by Bing Crosby. Apparently Crosby paid a company to film the
game by kinescope, while he traveled to Paris (unable to bear the
stress of watching the game via live broadcast) and listened to it on
the radio.117 Some might hesitate to call Crosby a curator and a
112

See AUBERT J. CLARK, THE MOVEMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT IN NINECENTURY AMERICA 58–63 (1960).
113 See generally EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP
(2010) (describing virtues of piracy).
114 See JOHNS, supra note 81, at 358–65, 381–99.
115 See id. at 463–96.
116 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451–52 (1984).
117 See Richard Sandomir, In Bing Crosby’s Wine Cellar, Vintage Baseball, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 23, 2010, at A1. Did Crosby act illegally? Probably not. Live broadcasts of athletic events were not copyrightable works of authorship. The exclusion of broadcast
signals from American copyright law and broadcasters’ efforts to use other law to
TEENTH
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famous baseball game a form of curated knowledge, but for my purposes, I think that he was, and it is.
IV. CURATION

AS

COMMONS

Pirate curation illustrates how knowledge curation at times straddles a complex line between curation policy that deals with knowledge
in context and curation policy that deals with knowledge abstracted
from context. IP doctrine falls mostly on the abstracted side of the
line; its goal, in nearly all cases, is to make a market in IP rights and
content. Yet pirates and piracy offer more-than-plausible claims to
beneficial spillovers from knowledge curation.118 The broad challenge
of knowledge curation therefore lies not solely in creating markets by
law where markets would not or do not otherwise exist.119 The challenge of knowledge curation is in many respects the challenge of
understanding a gift economy. Curation is backward-looking in part,
because it concerns how to maintain the integrity of what has already
been produced and distributed, but it is also gift-making for the benefit of future generations.120 To describe those gifts, legally, culturally,
and economically, I offer the concept of commons.
A. Commons Frameworks
One might assemble the doctrines, disciplines, and rules of IP law
and tangible property law into a kludge of a system of knowledge curation. Curation happens, one might say, and leave it at that. That
approach is manageable, up to a point, but unsatisfying. It offers limited interpretive power; it fails to capture purposeful individual, institutional, or social interests in curation; and it offers few opportunities
for policy prescriptions to implement it. Knowledge does not curate
itself. I offer a framework for understanding knowledge curation that
is grounded in the idea of cultural commons, borrowing what is valuable from proprietary market orientations that animate both IP rights
control their cable television rivals and acts of so-called “signal piracy” are recounted
in Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 311–24
(2004). Among the many changes wrought by the revision of copyright law in 1976
was the addition of a definition of “fixation” that brought live broadcasts within the
statute. See Nat’l Football League v. McBee & Bruno’s, Inc., 792 F.2d 726, 731–32
(8th Cir. 1986).
118 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
120 See LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY
(1983); Wendy J. Gordon, Response, Discipline and Nourish: On Constructing Commons,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 733, 734–35 (2010); Wendy J. Gordon, Render Copyright Unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 85–87 (2004).
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systems in general and most of its specific rules and doctrines but setting aside the presumption that these should dominate. IP systems
need not be foundational to solutions to knowledge curatorial challenges. Long before the invention of intellectual property, curatorial
memory practices were used to preserve knowledge that passed orally
from generation to generation.121
Knowledge curation need not be only or primarily about securing
the interest of the author or inventor. It need not be only or primarily
about protecting the interest of “the public” or future generations.
Instead, the goal is to understand the respective but intersecting and
sometimes changing roles of creators, consumers, communities, reusers, enterprises, and social and cultural practices in building and
sustaining individual and collective welfare—including individual and
personal identity and virtue—centered on forms of knowledge.122 Systems of intellectual property law have important roles to play in constructing that understanding, but they should be analyzed as elements
in dynamic institutional systems. Those systems include legal and
nonlegal dimensions and are grounded in public and private authority and in individual and collective agency.
What I mean by a commons framework is an institutional
approach to knowledge curation that begins with the idea of managed
openness, and structured sharing. Openness may exist at multiple
levels simultaneously: with respect to knowledge forms and practices
themselves (which may be characterized as variably open to use, adaptation, and extension), with respect to the location of participants in
governance (who may be inside or outside a commons institution or
community), and with respect to commons institutions or communities themselves (which may be more or less porous regarding membership or participation). Commons embraces influences on outcomes
that are grounded not only in legal rights and obligations but also in
social and institutional practices as well as individual interests, in patterned and unpatterned activity at the individual level (that is, intentional activity, rationally motivated and otherwise, and chance
activity), and in intersections between material and intangible
121 See FRANCES A. YATES, THE ART OF MEMORY (1966).
122 Generally, knowledge objects may serve as focal points and as boundary objects
for social groups, and group behavior may be the real source of the social value that
intellectual property regimes are intended to promote. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE
WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM
212 (2007); Dan Hunter & F. Gregory Lastowka, Amateur-to-Amateur, 46 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 951, 978–89 (2004); Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, and Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 153, 175–76, 181–82.
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form.123 A commons framework sets questions of knowledge as cultural resources in an ecological or environmental context, organizing
them in terms of overlapping, interdependent systems, rather than
isolating those questions as market challenges. Such a framework
offers a mechanism for investigating and modeling curation problems
without doing violence to either IP conventions or to the public goods
paradigm that usually drives them. It accommodates traditional IP
thinking in the context of broader question of practices of conservation and curation as well as innovation, without displacing accepted
notions of “progress.” The commons framework is centered on forms
of knowledge themselves and on institutions for processing interests
in them, rather than on an assessment of the interests of particular
upstream or downstream knowledge producers, consumers, firms, or
communities.
Commons is neither a place nor a thing. It is not the public
domain; it is not an intangible free-for-all. Commons is and are specific governance institutions for combining and sharing resources. In
the case of knowledge curation, commons is a way of understanding
how forms of knowledge are preserved and stewarded through time
and across generations, taking into account relevant IP rules but also
taking into account a range of other legal and nonlegal considerations in a way that allows scholars and policymakers to relate different
knowledge curation challenges to one another. As governance, commons deconstructs and then reconstructs a relevant institution or
environment, intending to identify its components and their patterns
of interaction and chance. Commons research typically seeks to
understand how resource pools function to enable the production of
bigger, better, greater, or different things. A patent pool collects individual, related patents for licensing on a streamlined basis so that
complex machines that depend on all of them can be produced
despite potentially fatal licensing complexities.124 In the knowledge
curation context, commons governance also enables the conservation
of old and existing things. A library, archive, museum, or collection—
123 Commons analysis as applied to cultural resources is grounded in the Institutional Analysis & Development (IAD) framework for natural resource commons
developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE
COMMONS 182–210 (1990); Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 45. The
IAD framework and its adaptation to cultural contexts are subject to a variety of criticisms. See Gregg P. Macey, Response, Cooperative Institutions in Cultural Commons, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 757, 766 (2010). For a partial reply, see Michael J. Madison, Brett M.
Frischmann & Katherine J. Strandburg, Reply, The Complexity of Commons, 95 CORNELL
L. REV. 839 (2010).
124 See Madison, Frischmann & Strandburg, supra note 45, at 660–61.
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a medieval institution, such as the Bodleian Library at Oxford (which
is a copyright deposit library under British law), or a modern, digital,
networked collection, such as the Internet Archive—offers a clear
illustration of a commons institution that is at the center of knowledge curation, supported not only by intellectual property law but also
by other legal systems, by history, and by norm, custom, and practice.
As a research strategy and descriptive tool, the cultural commons
framework proposes to consider a number of distinct but related topics in any cultural production or curation setting.125 The following
should be considered: (i) the units of analysis (the “what” of the relevant resource(s), taking material, intangible, and legal dimensions
into consideration), (ii) relevant participants (both individual and
institutional), (iii) formal and informal rules of access, use, contribution, and extraction (including property rules, liability rules, disciplinary rules, and social norms and practices, all including but not
limited to IP rules), and (iv) relevant degrees of openness, as
described above. Issues in clusters (ii), (iii), and (iv) often surround
the composition of formal communities and informal groups. Distinctions among private interest and public roles should be considered;
invoking commons as a framework does not preclude evaluation or
critique. Nor does it preclude regulation, investment, or other participation by appropriate government authority. Historical contingencies; technological, social, and economic change; background legal
and cultural conditions (roughly analogous to Kuhnian paradigms of
settled knowledge); and taste all should be accounted for.
Here, I offer the commons framework only partly as a research
strategy. I offer it also at least partly metaphorically, as a way of seeing
how the multiple legal and social influences on knowledge curation
might be synthesized. The relevant commons environment in many
cases of knowledge curation, focused on the intangible rather than
the material, will be the individual work of authorship or invention or
mark itself. The relevant items or units of analysis are not necessarily
smaller components of a larger whole or of a common pool, though
they may be. They are, in the first place, ideas, works of authorship,
or inventions, or marks themselves. Commons for knowledge curation hinges on a key distinction. In the knowledge curation context,
commons is a framework for understanding how a given resource, a
knowledge work, is produced, distributed, consumed, donated,
exchanged, collected, archived, loaned, and/or returned—
unchanged. The basic rule of extraction and contribution is identity.
125 This paragraph condenses material described in Madison, Frischmann &
Strandburg, supra note 45, at 683–707.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\86-5\NDL508.txt

1986

unknown

Seq: 30

notre dame law review

17-NOV-11

11:06

[vol. 86:5

The knowledge object may be used, intact, and should be returned,
intact. Modifications, adaptations, and improvements are often (but
not always) permitted, but changes and changed versions occupy distinct conceptual spaces and often occupy distinct physical spaces. No
matter how many times Shakespeare is reprinted, performed, or
adapted, the original canon remains the original canon. No legal rule
requires this, however.126 The identity of Shakespeare—the body of
work, not the man—is a product of history, tradition, and convention.127 Adaptations are recognized by audiences and by society as a
whole as separate enterprises. The law may and sometimes does intervene to mediate the relationship between new and old. Cover recordings of twentieth century popular music are permitted by compulsory
license in American copyright law, but the compulsory character
applies on condition that the new work preserve the “the basic melody
or fundamental character” of the original musical composition.128
More dramatic changes require a negotiated license between the copyright owner and the would-be adapter.
Commons as a curation strategy, blending questions of control,
use, and long-term cultural stability, accepts as a premise the idea that
knowledge may be given or shared, as well as sold.129 In the context
of the public goods model, a commons approach offers a kind of risk
pool to creators, innovators, curators, and to future consumers. If the
low present value of future curatorial benefits means that few current
producers or knowledge curators will invest in curation for the future,
then a pooling or commons approach offsets the risk that any one
producer or distributor will suffer the entirety of curatorial cost.
Structuring a legal regime to encourage structured pooling and sharing of creative works, rather than extending or broadening copyright
126 For example, in early 2011 a publisher decided to print an edition of Mark
Twain’s ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN that substituted the word “slave” for the
offensive “n-word.” This may or may not be a good idea, but it is not illegal under
American law. See Julie Bosman, Publisher Tinkers With Twain, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2011,
at A12.
127 See GREENBLATT, supra note 31, at 13.
128 See 17 U.S.C. § 115(a)(2) (2006). The law of “colorization” of old black-andwhite films offers a related example. In the late 1980s, American copyright owners of
older films “colorized” some of their catalog, as they were entitled to do under copyright law, in order to find new markets for the works. Heirs of directors of some of
the films, notably John Huston, sought relief under French law, where they had standing to pursue claims of violation of their moral rights as authors. See Craig A. Wagner,
Note, Motion Picture Colorization, Authenticity, and the Elusive Moral Right, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 628, 701 n.446 (1989). The controversy precipitated the creation of the National
Film Preservation Board. See supra note 80.
129 See Gordon, Response, supra note 120.
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owners’ exclusive rights, may be more likely to pay off in terms of
knowledge durability. Few works will be as durable as Shakespeare or
Homer, but commons governance offers producers and knowledge
curators the ability to pool and therefore minimize the costs of learning, over time, which ones may be. No one creator or institution
bears all of the cost; all share the benefits—in a structured way, rather
than a casual one. Shakespeare and Homer are with us today because
of the successful evolution of a commons model. Many more works
have disappeared because related commons models did not succeed.
Looking ahead, understanding the mechanics of knowledge curation
as commons should help policymakers think more critically about policy choices—including IP choices—that enable successful commons
and disable weak commons.
Using commons as a framework for understanding “giving” as
well as taking brings additional tools into the knowledge curation conversation. Knowledge curation as commons highlights the prospect
that curation may not always be only about knowledge itself. Commons researchers sometimes emphasize the importance of nested
commons institutions.130 Modest commons may exist within a larger
institutional commons framework. Curation of individual forms of
knowledge may not happen without the active engagement of other
commons institutions—communities of practice, disciplines, arts, and
organizations, such as libraries and archives. Individual forms of
knowledge may be constitutive of groups, serving as boundary objects
and/or focal points for each of these things. The commons framework therefore makes room explicitly for institutions, practices, preferences, and histories that may be excluded from or marginalized in
IP-based accounts of knowledge. If a work that is currently in the public domain—Shakespeare, to take my most salient example—does not
preserve itself, then who is making judgments to determine that the
work is worth preserving, that it is worth preserving in any of a wide
variety of forms and formats, and that it should be made available to
others (or not)? How, when, by whom, and why are those judgments
being made? What is the role of state subsidies and provisioning of
the knowledge goods in question? To what extent should these decisions be left to the so-called “market”? What is the role of emerging
forms of “distributed production”?131

130 See Elinor Ostrom et al., Going Beyond Panaceas, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
U.S. 15, 176 (2007).
131 See BENKLER, supra note 122.
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B. Commons Illustrations
Commons are more common that we think, so to speak, even
within core IP disciplines. The simplest illustrations of recasting
knowledge curation as commons-based governance come from difficult IP problems and solutions. This Section touches on several of
them, not proposing to resolve them but to show how they can be
approached as governance rather than assimilated to market models,
as they typically are.
In copyright, knowledge curation as commons appears in special
provisions for collecting and archiving knowledge goods when those
provisions are viewed jointly with institutional arrangements. Statutory provisions discussed earlier offer initial, if modest, examples. Collectors and compilers of pre-existing material are rewarded with their
own copyrights, even if individual items collected or compiled are in
the public domain because of expired or never-existing copyrights,132
so long as collecting or compiling is undertaken with appropriate
judgment.133 Libraries and archives have safe harbors for collecting,
reproducing, and making available individual and collected knowledge artifacts, in addition to baseline privileges to distribute and display copyrighted works afforded under the doctrine of first sale.134
Copyright and related rights shade more aggressively into the idea of
knowledge curation as commons via institutional arrangements that
impose affirmative duties on individuals and communities who
encounter forms of knowledge. Compulsory and statutory licenses are
often conditioned on preserving the identity of the work used by the
licensee.135 Private communal licensing, such as open source licenses,
and innovation-enabling licensing, such as Creative Commons, offer
copyright-supported institutional schemes for preserving original
works even as those works are intentionally shared by their creators
with potential modifiers.136 These are copyright commons, but commons that should take explicit account of historical, financial, organizational, and disciplinary considerations that bear on the constitution
of libraries, archives, museums, collections, and databases.
132 See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (compilation works covered by copyright); id.
§ 101 (compilation works include collective works).
133 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
134 See 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2006) (first sale and display); id. § 118 (reproduction by
libraries and archives).
135 See id. § 115 (cover recordings); id. § 119 (secondary transmissions); id. § 122
(satellite retransmissions).
136 See Michael J. Madison, Notes on a Geography of Knowledge, 77 FORDHAM L. REV.
2039, 2078 (2009).
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Moral rights, particularly anti-modification or mutilation rights,
can be assimilated to copyright as parts of a knowledge curation
approach. The famous case of Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,137
in which the members of Monty Python obtained a preliminary
injunction in copyright preventing an American broadcaster from
continuing to show episodes of Monty Python’s Flying Circus that had
been edited without Monty Python’s consent, was among other things
an effort to impose a curatorial standard on a knowledge work, that is,
to preserve a kind of iconic Monty Python commons for the benefit of
further audiences. Neither that case nor the legal claims that were
invoked successfully should be understood, however, independent of
the imperatives of the BBC, the original home of the Pythons, ABC,
the defendant broadcaster with internal and external constraints
given by federal broadcast regulation, and the history of Monty
Python itself, a comedy troop that had already achieved significant
commercial success in England and that was known to niche or elite
audiences in the United States via public broadcasting. The entertainers were trying not merely to protect their own future commercial
interests, but also to protect their pre-existing comedic goodwill.138
The twenty-first century popularity of Monty Python largely attests to
their success.
In patent, knowledge curation takes place not only through the
constitution and application of relevant technical arts, as described
above, but also through negotiations over proprietary claims to technical standards, such as pharmaceutical compounds whose patents
expire, and through expansive patent protection given to so-called
pioneer inventions. The intersection between proprietary pharmaceutical compounds and the rights of generic drug manufacturers to
use those compounds after patents expire, in chemically unchanged
form, is mediated by the federal Hatch-Waxman statute, in order to
ensure that consumers have prompt access to generics after patents
expire.139 “Pioneer” inventions are accorded broader rights because
of their role in establishing or transforming technical fields or industries.140 In each of these examples the existence and scope of patent
137 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
138 See ROBERT HEWISON, MONTY PYTHON 46–47 (1981).
139 See C. Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the Hatch-Waxman Act, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. (forthcoming 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1736822.
140 A classic example of a pioneer invention, which represents a revolutionary
technological advance, is the flying machine, or airplane. See Wright Co. v. Paulhan,
177 F. 261, 261 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910). Perhaps not coincidentally, one of the first and
most significant patent pools of the twentieth century involved patents on aircraft
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rights is considered explicitly as part of industry-dependent structures
and related institutions. A particularly vivid illustration of the idea of
knowledge commons in patent law, and one that blends an image of a
collection of knowledge itself with a portrait of how that knowledge is
being preserved, come from judicial elaboration of the idea of prior
art as a kind of museum of prior patents and technical papers hanging
on the walls of the inventor, in In re Winslow.141 In Winslow, as in all
cases involving the law’s nonobviousness standard, the question was
whether the relevant prior art “taught” the invention produced by the
inventor, a standard that regularly requires that courts, the Patent
Office, and inventors and artisans refresh the concept of technical
commons in order to distinguish inventions from it. More recent
judicial interpretations of nonobviousness institutionalize that task in
more explicitly curatorial terms, that is, requiring that outcomes be
more judgment-based, grounded in the relevant art or discipline, and
less mechanical.142
In trademark, application of the requirement that marks persist
so long as they are used in commerce makes the commons idea more
accessible from the beginning. Stable producer/consumer relationships that hinge on a fulcrum of goodwill symbolized by valid marks
are, on this reading, curatorial commons in themselves. This proposition comes to life in collective marks and certification marks143 and
above all in geographical indications of origin.144 All of these are
forms of knowledge that embody not only goodwill as embodied in
technologies. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property
Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1343–46 (1996). In
modern patent doctrine, that broader protection comes in the form of broader language used in valid patent claims. Improvement patents are necessarily limited to
narrower claim language. John Duffy notes that this approach emphasizes a formalistic approach to claim drafting and interpretation at the expense of an older approach
that explicitly considered the social value of an invention and awarded broader rights
to more significant ones. See John F. Duffy, The Thirteenth Annual Honorable Helen
Wilson Nies Memorial Lecture in Intellectual Property Law: Innovation and Recovery, 14
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 237 259–63 (2010); see generally John R. Thomas, The
Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 35 (1995)
(describing the philosophical and historical foundations of the doctrine).
141 365 F.2d 1017 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
142 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–22 (2007) (“As our precedents make clear, however, the analysis need not seek out precise teachings directed
to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim, for a court can take account of
the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.”).
143 See 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006) (permitting registration of collective and certification marks); id. § 1127 (defining collective and certification marks).
144 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 4, at art. 22.
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the relationship between a sign or mark, on the one hand, and a product or service, on the other hand, but partake of a specific and stable
cultural meaning, or knowledge form, over and above whatever level
of “quality” consumers may infer. A collective mark is used by a group
rather than by an individual or firm; it denotes goods or services
offered by the group, or membership in the group.145 A certification
mark denotes that the relevant goods or services conform to quality
standards enforced by the certifying authority, though the goods or
services are supplied by some other party. A geographical indication
of origin (GI) consists of a designation that an agricultural product—
wine, cheese, pork, potatoes—is produced in the region designated in
the GI. In each case the point of the mark is not only to supply information to consumers or to differentiate goods and services from rival
offerings. The point of the mark is to embody the continuing identity
of the relevant group, body of standards, or regional culture and
community.
Perhaps the most interesting illustrations of knowledge curation
in commons frameworks come from beyond (or adjacent to) intellectual property. Peer review for academic research perpetuates disciplinary norms and traditions associated with particular fields.146
Disciplines that have evolved to organize information and knowledge
in order to ensure ease of access—from the Linnaean system of classifying living things to the Dewey Decimal System to the periodical table
of the elements—establish commons both to preserve existing knowledge and to allow it to be extended on existing frameworks. Normbased communities have both preserved and extended robust fields of
knowledge with little support from formal intellectual property doctrines.147 Neither those disciplines nor their application is unfailingly
benign, of course. Describing knowledge curation in terms of commons invites precisely the kind of normative evaluation of the value of
knowledge that copyright and patent law try to avoid. A contemporary example of a curatorial question where analysis might be
improved on precisely this basis by shifting from an IP frame to a commons frame is Internet search, where considering regulatory
responses to charges that Google and other search providers unfairly
145
146

See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (defining collective and certification marks).
See CHRISTINE L. BORGMAN, SCHOLARSHIP IN THE DIGITAL AGE: INFORMATION,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND THE INTERNET 65–68 (2007) (identifying the functions of scholarly communication as legitimization, dissemination, and (taken together) access,
preservation, and curation).
147 See, e.g., Oliar & Sprigman, supra note 1, at 1809–31 (describing norm-based
system for maintaining innovative domain of stand-up comedy).
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manipulate search results is colored by claims that “the market” will
sort out what search providers do and how they do it.148
V.

DEEPER CHALLENGES

FOR

KNOWLEDGE CURATION

No framework for knowledge curation is without its challenges.
Some of those challenges are characteristic of all IP systems. Some are
distinctive here, in the context of commons frameworks. I highlight
them below but do not respond in detail (or in some cases, at all).
They are hooks for continuing the conversation about the virtues and
drawbacks of knowledge curation as a framing concept.
A. Nonrivalry
How it is possible that any intangible forms of knowledge do not
survive intergenerationally? A work of authorship never degrades
from overuse (despite some claims that it may, culturally speaking).
An invention may be superseded or improved, but the knowledge represented in the invention does not degrade. What is it that society
might be trying to “preserve,” and why does it need to be preserved?
At some level, intangible knowledge forms simply exist, once they
have been created, and notwithstanding the fact that those forms
evolve over time
The concern is valid, and it captures precisely the point of my
interest: Why is it and how is it that some forms of knowledge are
preserved, intact, across time and space so that they play an ongoing
role in contemporary cultural life? Why is it and how is it that other
forms “exist” in some abstract sense but disappear, either literally or,
for all practical purposes, culturally? Some scholars have referred to
influence and reputation as organizing concepts for drawing these distinctions.149 My canvas of IP regimes could be directed, in part,
toward understanding the institutions of influence, legal and
otherwise.
148 Compare generally Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet Trademark
Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005) (arguing against legal regulation of search results),
with Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149 (2008) (suggesting federal
regulation of search engines). The idea of curation in the search context is particularly complex because of the attenuated character of human judgment represented in
search algorithms.
149 See BECKER, supra note 29, at 351–71.
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B. Levels of the Thing: Conserving Rights, Objects, and
Intangible Knowledge
What is the interaction between interests in knowledge curation,
on the one hand, and IP doctrines that distinguish among intangible
legal rights, intangible works and inventions, and tangible objects and
material processes, on the other hand? For curation purposes, why is
it not sufficient to rely on a combination of a robust public domain
and robust doctrines of fixation and embodiment? I criticize the
weaknesses of proprietary, market-oriented IP regimes. Why are proprietary, market-oriented chattel property regimes (including cultural
heritage law) insufficient as solutions? I have suggested that the relevant inadequacy is directed to the fact that the interests at stake are
intangible, but that suggestion depends on distinctions among legal
right (such as the copyright), legal thing (such as the original work of
authorship), and tangible thing (such as the tangible medium of
expression) that are defined by the law in the first place and that are
not consistently represented throughout law or practice. Clarifying
the purpose of commons as knowledge curation requires clarifying
what, precisely, commons is dealing with. Which knowledge forms
and practices are curated and which of those things evolve? Any particular item may be treated in both ways.
C. Types of Works: Sustained Works, Ephemeral Works, Hobbyist Works,
User-Generated Works (Amateur Art) and “Personality” Works
The question of knowledge curation has been raised recently in
the context of User-Generated Content, or what I call amateur art.150
Given all of the supposedly great stuff now being produced and
uploaded to YouTube and music sharing sites, what institutional
mechanisms exist to ensure that some measure of this stuff is preserved? How can we know that the right or best stuff is preserved, if
we can? Curation is value-based; the term and the discipline come
freighted with implications for choice—preserve this but not that;
offer assurances of trust regarding scope of the curator’s enterprise,
the integrity of the work, and access to it—that challenge the supposedly value-free, market-based frameworks that dominate the IP discussion. Are “sustained” works, which are more complex creative works
that demand more capital investment and coordination to pro150 See Michael J. Madison, Beyond Creativity: Copyright as Knowledge Law, 12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 821 (2010).
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duce,151 more deserving of preservation and curation? What about
works and inventions produced by “creative” professionals rather than
by amateur artists?152 What about ephemera, material that may come
within copyright’s ambit but only because of the trivial standards for
protection that courts and Congress have given us? Some scholars
suggest that works that are somehow more closely aligned with an
author’s personality or personhood are deserving of special protection; some European copyright traditions echo this perspective.153
What about biases built into curatorial judgments based on race, class,
income, gender, and other things?154 A commons framework does
not avoid those questions, as IP law now tries to, but neither does it
require that they be answered ex ante. Judgment is part and parcel of
processes and mechanisms of curation. The relationship between cultural value and legal sanction is more complex than IP now makes it
out to be.155 Value may follow curation, rather than the other way
around. Arguably, this is the case with Shakespeare and Homer.
D. The Problem of Groups and Places: Collective Curation at
Work and Home
An underappreciated feature of curatorial practices has been the
extent to which they have been linked not only to specific institutions
and disciplines, such as museums, archives, and libraries, but to specific places: buildings and campuses dedicated wholly or partly to that
purpose, such as universities, churches and other places of worship,
and monasteries. “Home-based knowledge curation,” which became
common in the Renaissance as wealthy individuals acquired private
libraries of books,156 gradually receded in importance as librarianship
151 See Ginsburg, supra note 47, at 1499 (coining the term “sustained works”); Neil
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 288–89
(1996).
152 See Robert P. Merges, The Concept of Property in the Digital Era, 45 HOUS. L. REV.
1239, 1249–68 (2008).
153 See generally George H. Taylor & Michael J. Madison, Metaphor, Objects, and Commodities, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 141, 145–51 (2006) (evaluating this perspective
critically).
154 See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2004) (criticizing the concept of the public domain as an
abstraction free of institutional or cultural influence).
155 See, e.g., Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
247, 249–50 (1998) (describing inevitable influence of aesthetic values on copyright
decisionmaking); Duffy, supra note 140, at 259–63 (describing heterogeneous nature
of innovation that is in tension with standard model used by patent law).
156 For examples of nineteenth century literature describing the idiosyncratic
curatorial practices associated with private libraries, see LUTHER FARNHAM, A GLANCE
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developed as a professional discipline157 and as states and philanthropists began to support public libraries,158 only to reappear during the
latter part of the twentieth century. Home-based taping, first for
audio (in the 1950s and 1960s) and then for video (in the 1970s and
1980s), reintroduced in broad public form the notion that knowledge
preservation need not be restricted to a specific place or to a specific
class.
Collective curation is closely related to home-based curation.
Wikipedia is the largest and best-known Internet-based collective
knowledge sharing enterprise, and as such it is characterized by two
related, distinctive features. First, anyone can participate in creating
or editing Wikipedia content, and second, Wikipedia is located “on”
the Internet and therefore in not any one place in particular. A closer
look at Wikipedia reveals a more complex institution. “Wikipedians,”
those who curate Wikipedia’s content, discipline themselves formally
and informally via norms that have proved quite robust, if far from
perfect.159 And despite Wikipedia’s placeless-ness, Wikipedia’s knowledge does have locations; it is located both wherever Wikipedia’s servers are located and simultaneously wherever a user has access to the
World Wide Web. In a sense, and depending on the particular electronic storage arrangement that underlies Wikipedia or any related
distributed, networked knowledge resource, knowledge is in “the
cloud,” the term of the moment that refers to electronic storage,
quickly accessible, from somewhere in the network of networks.160
Such collective knowledge curation is not an entirely novel phenomenon. Homer is with us today because of collective memory practices
that made up the oral tradition.
AT PRIVATE LIBRARIES (1855), and ARTHUR L. HUMPHREYS, THE PRIVATE LIBRARY 87–94
(New York, J.W. Bouton 1897). See generally Private Libraries in Renaissance England:
A Collection and Catalogue of Tudor and Early Stuart Book-Lists (R.J. Fehrenbach et
al. eds.), an ongoing research project described at http://wmpeople.wm.edu/site/
page/rjfehr/home (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
157 The American Library Association was founded in 1876. See History, ALA,
http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/missionhistory/history/index.cfm (last visited
Sept. 21, 2011). The International Federation of Library Associations and Institutions
was founded in 1927. See 75 years of IFLA: 1927–2002, IFLA, http://archive.ifla.org/
III/75ifla/75index.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2011).
158 The industrialist Andrew Carnegie supported the construction of thousands of
public libraries worldwide. See ABIGAIL A. VAN SLYCK, FREE TO ALL (1995).
159 See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT
146–48 (2008).
160 See Christopher S. Yoo, The Changing Patterns of Internet Usage, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 67, 83–86 (2010).
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The challenge here is to imagine how IP rules and other rules
might be configured to enable valuable collective curatorial practices
in commons frameworks. Legal and policy frameworks for knowledge
institutions, including digital intermediaries, are key. Might it be possible, for example, to conceive of the peer-to-peer Internet downloading/uploading phenomenon of the last decade not solely as an
exercise in massive infringement of proprietary rights but as, in part, a
distributed home- and person-based curatorial regime? Not by way of
justifying illegal downloading in terms of copyright law, but by way of
understanding some of the impulse that drives filesharing, and, more
important, by way of assessing its full costs and benefits.161
E. Technical Platforms and Standards
Because of the explosion of technologies of creativity over the last
150 years—photography, recorded music, motion pictures, xerography, faxing, television and videotape, and computer technology—
knowledge curation now embraces questions of infrastructure as well
as questions of works of authorship and inventions and the like.
Should knowledge curation questions be addressed separately to the
machines by which we access and use knowledge, or treated as part of
broader commons regimes, and in either case, why and how? These
questions take several specific forms, each of which has become more
acute in the digital age: format preservation, intersections between
machines and software and digital content that trigger concerns about
obsolescence, hacking, and reverse engineering,162 and access to technical platforms.163 One might plausibly argue that these “infrastructural” questions should be addressed as commons precisely because
161 Costs and benefits here extend far beyond interest in knowledge curation. See
Jonathan Zittrain, Ubiquitous Human Computing, PHIL. TRANS. ROYAL SOC’Y A, 366,
3813–21 (2008) (evaluating “distributed human computing”).
162 The anticircumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA), for example, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1202 (2006), are in one sense an extension
of proprietary rights assumptions that drive copyright law. In a different sense they
represent an awkwardly implemented effort to enable copyright owners to manage
digital knowledge commons, by requiring that users of digital content obey governance rules coded into proprietary technology. Knowledge may be used, as it were,
only as our machines permit. See generally ZITTRAIN, supra note 159.
163 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1580 (2002). The technical platform in question
might be a general purpose computer operating system, a videogame environment, or
a social standard. Or all three; divisions among these things are less clear than they
once were. See MDY Industries, LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928 (9th Cir.
2010) (determining that aftermarket supplier of robot software to be used in online
game environment was liable for violating the DMCA, where the underlying com-
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IP-based solutions to the public goods problem with respect to infrastructure leaves society undersupplied.164 One way to look at curated
knowledge is as a kind of cultural infrastructure.
CONCLUSION
The article is intended to begin a conversation about a topic that
is not broadly explored in the legal literature. I have described the
question of knowledge curation: whether, when, and how the intangible creative and innovative content that is the usual subject matter of
copyright, patent, and trademark law is preserved and conserved over
time, unchanged, and evaluated and shared. I argue that conventional IP accounts of creativity and innovation are inadequate to
explain the phenomenon and that a broader and more useful account
can be located in the concept of cultural commons.
I have asked perhaps more questions than I have answered. My
description of the virtues of commons suggests some possible normative payoffs that I leave for later development.165 I have hinted at but
not elaborated the possible costs of a commons perspective.
While I am sanguine about the analytic possibilities that commons offers with respect to preserving old things and understanding
how to preserve current things and things yet to come, I am not without reservations. Focusing attention on future generations’ access to
and use of old things expresses a kind of aesthetic preference that
modern law typically shies away from, for reasons related to general
societal discomfort with elite art and institutions that house it. There
is an apparently antidemocratic, anti-egalitarian ethos implicit in the
very question that is a bit unsettling. To resist the new is to resist
progress of an obvious sort. It is, in part, to invite cultural and social
stagnation.
The challenge of knowledge curation is to understand intersections between interests in cultural stability and dynamism without
accepting uncritically the modern linkage between innovation and
market exchange, that is, without indulging that different aesthetic
plaint appeared to be that the defendant enabled game players to break the gaming
rules governing the online community).
164 See Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 1020–22 (2005).
165 Other scholars have deployed the idea of “the cultural commons,” defined as
humanity’s shared storehouse of art and knowledge, to make explicitly normative
claims defending that commons against propertization and privatization. See, e.g.,
LEWIS HYDE, COMMON AS AIR: REVOLUTION, ART, AND OWNERSHIP (2010).
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preference.166 Commons offers a framework for accommodating and
understanding markets together with other institutions for organizing
human behavior, legal and otherwise, with respect to our many different forms of knowledge.

166 See Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights
Management,” 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 464–65 (1998).

